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Abstract 
 
In this paper, we empirically test the role that religious and political institutions 
play in the accumulation of human capital. Using a new data set on literacy in 
colonial India, we find that Muslim literacy is negatively correlated with the 
proportion of Muslims in the district, although we find no similar result for Hindu 
literacy. We employ a theoretical model which suggests that districts which 
experienced a more recent collapse of Muslim political authority had more 
powerful and better funded religious authorities, who established religious schools 
which were less effective at promoting literacy on the margin than state schools. 
We test this hypothesis econometrically, finding that the period of Muslim 
political collapse has a statistically significant effect on Muslim literacy while 
controlling for it eliminates the significance of the proportion of Muslims on 
Muslim literacy. This suggests that the “long hand of history” has played some 
role in subsequent differences in human capital formation through the persistence 
of institutions discouraging literacy. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Social scientists have long recognized the important relationship between education and 
economic growth. More educated societies often have higher worker productivity, greater life 
expectancy and are also quicker to adopt new technologies (Schultz 1983; Becker 1964; Drèze 
and Sen 1998).1 Despite the numerous social and private benefits of education, enrollment and 
literacy, however, vary dramatically across countries, religions and social groups. A large 
majority of the citizens of developed countries acquired functional literacy by the early 20th 
century, while citizens of developing countries such as Chad and India are still struggling with 
literacy rates of 48% and 52% respectively. Even within countries, there are significant 
differences in human capital accumulation between groups such as blacks and whites in the 
Unites States (Margo 1990; Hanushek, Kaln, and Rivkin 2004; Fryer and Austen-Smith 2005). 
To account for differences in educational development, some scholars note the role of 
government policies (Fernandez and Rodrik 1991; Lindert 2004; Galor and Moav 2006; Rajan 
2009), while a more recent literature emphasizes the historical importance of religion and 
religious norms that either constrain or encourage religious groups to acquire literacy at a higher 
rate relative to other religious groups living in the same region (Becker and Woessmann 2008, 
2009; Botticini and Eckstein 2005, 2007). Our paper relates to this broader literature by studying 
historical differences in educational attainment between the two main religious groups of India—
Hindus and Muslims.2 
Average Muslim literacy was slightly below average Hindu literacy in the colonial period 
and the variance in Muslim literacy was also lower than Hindu literacy (in 1911, the male Hindu 
literacy rate was 12.8% and the male Muslim literacy rate was 12.0%). However, there was 
                                                 
1 There is vast literature on human capital, growth and development such as Lucas (1988), Barro (1991), Mankiw, 
and Romer and Weil (1992) among many others. 
2 Ghurye (1961), Srinivas (1998) and Borooah and Iyer (2005) have also commented on literacy differences in India.  
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tremendous heterogeneity between provinces. For example, in Bengal 21.1% of Hindu males 
were able to read and write in any language as compared to only 10.9% of Muslim males. But, in 
provinces such as Madras and the United Provinces, Muslims enjoyed comparable or even higher 
literacy than Hindus. Female literacy was very low for both religious groups, but the provincial 
patterns are similar to those for male literacy.  
This paper uses the earliest reliable data on literacy and a theoretical model to explore 
why Hindus and Muslims had different literacy rates under the British.  The difference in literacy 
is a puzzle, because it appears to be a function not only of demographics and economic 
conditions, but also of the share of Muslims in a district.3 Using data from the 1911 and 1921 
census, we find that districts with more Muslims had lower literacy rates. The British were 
keenly aware of the differences and actually devoted more resources to education in Muslim 
districts, yet seemingly to no avail.  
Our model explains this pattern by examining the incentives of Muslim religious 
authorities, political authorities and the citizens. Specifically, we argue that where Muslim rule in 
India collapsed more recently, Muslim religious authorities were stronger vis-à-vis the British. 
This is due to the legitimizing role that religious authorities have historically played for Muslim 
political authorities, a relationship that is an exogenous remnant of the birth of Islam and the type 
of institutions that it encouraged (for more, see Rubin 2009). The model suggests that areas 
where Muslim political authorities collapsed more recently had stronger religious authorities that 
were better able to compete for Muslim students with the British. These authorities attracted 
                                                 
3 Our results bear a striking resemblance to other studies that have found similar negative effects on the educational 
attainment of minority groups living in areas heavily populated by their own group such as blacks in the United 
States (Margo 1990; Hanushek, Kaln, and Rivkin 2004). While the explanations for some of these findings in US 
studies are related to differences in the supply of schooling, it could also be related to differential preferences within 
minority groups living in non-minority versus minority areas (Fryer and Austen-Smith 2005). We concentrate 
primarily on the former type of explanation in this paper. 
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more Muslims to schools with religious curricula that, on the margin, were less effective at 
promoting literacy.  
Our model thus implies that the share of Muslims in a district may merely proxy for the 
historical situation in which certain Muslim-dominant regions established institutions that 
discouraged literacy. If this is true, then areas where Muslim rule collapsed a longer time ago 
should have more Muslim students attending secular (public) schools and thus the fraction of 
Muslims should contribute less (if at all) to lower literacy in these districts. We test this 
hypothesis by controlling for the period of Muslim collapse using three dummy variables: 
districts where Muslim rule collapsed prior to 1765, when Muslim rule fell in parts of the 
northern and eastern areas of India; 1765 to 1805, when Muslim rule collapsed in some of the 
southern and northern regions; and post-1805, when Muslim rule collapsed in the northern and 
western areas (Robinson 1982). 
Though this is admittedly a noisy proxy, we find that a more recent collapse has a 
negative and statistically significant effect on Muslim literacy. Moreover, once we control for the 
period of Muslim collapse, the presence of other Muslims has no statistically significant effect 
on Muslim literacy. This more nuanced approach which incorporates the effects of institutions on 
actions and outcomes thus provides a more complete picture of both the relationship between 
Hindu and Muslim literacy in this period and, more generally, the relationship between 
institutions and differences in human capital formation between groups. 
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: EDUCATION, COLONIZATION, AND LITERACY 
Beginning in the mid-19th century, the former indigenous system of Indian schooling was 
largely replaced by a new state system of schooling introduced by the East India Company and 
developed further by the colonial government after the East India Company’s rule came to an 
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end in 1857. Schools were of two types under the former indigenous system: elite religious 
schools for students interested in a lifetime of higher education and local elementary schools 
where village boys were taught the 3 R’s in the vernacular medium. The religious schools were 
differentiated by religion (Hindu or Muslim) with upper caste Brahman teachers and pupils 
dominating the Hindu (i.e. Sanskrit) religious schools, although Hindus did occasionally teach at 
some of the Muslim schools (madrassas). The local schools also encompassed Qur’an schools 
(i.e. maktabs) where Muslim boys learned to read the Qur’an. Some historians suggest that 8 to 
12 percent of the male population was literate, but we interpret the estimates with caution, as a 
systematic enumeration of literacy did not begin until the early 20th century.4 
Under the British system, publicly financed and managed schools (government and local 
board schools) functioned alongside privately managed aided and unaided schools. Private aided 
schools received public subsidies despite being privately managed, while private unaided schools 
did not receive any public money.5 Privately managed schools came under the authority of the 
state school system because they conformed to official education standards and their students 
were allowed to take public examinations.  
At the primary level, a smaller proportion of the schools were pure public schools as 
compared to the hybrid public-private aided schools and private unaided schools. The proportion, 
however, varied significantly across provinces with Bombay having a large number of pure 
public schools and Bengal having a large number of aided and unaided schools (Chaudhary 
2009b). Although many of the former indigenous schools disappeared over this period, some 
were successfully converted into public aided schools and the remaining were classified as 
                                                 
4 See Nurullah and Naik (1951) and Basu (1982) for details. Basu (1982) suggests that literacy was more 
commonplace among Brahmans and other upper caste males. Unfortunately, there is no systematic data available to 
gauge the spread of schooling or estimate the degree of literacy in the population.   
5 See Progress of Education, Quinquennial Reviews (volumes 1897-1927). See Nurullah and Naik (1951), Basu 
(1974), and Ghosh (2000) for a historical examination of colonial Indian education.  
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private unrecognized schools. According to one British official, competition with state schools 
hastened the decline of better quality indigenous schools, especially the Muslim religious 
maktabs and madrassas (Leitner 1991).  
The emphasis on both public and private schools is also reflected in the composition of 
educational spending in this period. Public sources of revenues represented 50 percent of total 
spending on education, increasing to 60 percent by the 1940s, while fees and private 
contributions accounted for the remaining 50 percent. Differences in land revenues were 
primarily responsible for differences in public revenues both across and within provinces. In 
general, the eastern provinces of Bengal and Bihar had lower public spending compared to other 
provinces because they received lower land revenues due to the Permanent Settlement of 1793 
that fixed land revenues in cash for perpetuity (Chaudhary 2009b). 
Beginning in the 1880s, primary education was decentralized to local district councils, 
who levied an additional tax on land revenues (known as the land cess or local cess) to cover 
spending on local public services such as education, infrastructure and medical services.  Despite 
the decentralization, district councils had limited fiscal independence to set new taxes or alter the 
existing tax rates on land revenues. The tax rate was fixed for districts within the same province 
(6.25% on average), but did vary across provinces. Moreover, the revenues were fairly inelastic 
because land revenue assessments were revised every 20 to 30 years in non-Permanent 
Settlement districts. Over time provincial governments also distributed grants to district councils 
especially targeted toward improving the quality and quantity of rural primary schools. Both 
public and private primary schools relied heavily on fees, although public school fees decreased 
over time as more public money became available.6 
                                                 
6 See Chaudhary (2009a, 2009b) for details on the provision of education in British India. 
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As the new system of education developed over the 19th and 20th centuries, there was a 
dramatic increase in spending, number of schools per-capita, and enrollment rates (Chaudhary 
2009b).  Per-capita spending increased ten-fold between 1881 and 1931 from 95 to 1000 rupees 
per 1000 persons and enrollment rates increased to 30 percent of the school age population by 
1931. The improvements in spending and enrollment, however, did not translate into literacy 
gains and less than 10 percent of the population of British India could read and write by 1931.7 
Yet, the averages for British India mask the substantial heterogeneity across regions and 
across religions. Among Hindus, literacy patterns generally followed the social hierarchy of the 
caste system with Brahmans (the traditional upper castes) enjoying above average literacy 
compared to the lower castes. There were also significant differences in enrollment and literacy 
between Hindus and Muslims. Muslim literacy was lower on average than Hindu literacy and 
Hindu-Muslim enrollment differentials were large at the secondary and post-secondary level. 
Official reports often point to religion and poverty to account for the relative educational 
backwardness of Muslims. For example, the Fifth Quinquennial review (p. 282) states,  
the backwardness [of Muslims] is attributable partly to poverty, partly to 
indifference, and partly to their educational wants not being the same as those of 
the remainder of the population amongst whom they live. They require their 
children to learn the Koran by rote at an age when other children are beginning to 
make progress in secular education, and they have a preference for the use of 
Urdu as a medium of instruction, even when it is not the vernacular language of 
the locality. Both these causes operate to make the common schools less attractive 
to Muhammadans than to members of other creeds and also to make it more 
difficult for Government to provide schools suited to their special needs. 
 
Colonial policies tried to bridge the gap between the two religions by offering 
scholarships to Muslim students and public subsidies to indigenous Muslim religious schools that 
were willing to introduce secular education. But, they often faced heavy resistance from local 
                                                 
7 To account for this discrepancy between enrollment and literacy, British officials frequently noted the general 
wastage and inefficiency of the Indian education system. See Progress of Education, Tenth Quinquennial Review 
(1927-32).  
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Muslim communities that did not view the new state schools in the same positive light as 
Hindus. A small minority of British officials blamed colonial educational policies themselves, 
suggesting that they may have inadvertently reduced the quality of indigenous religious schools. 
In this view, increased competition from state schools diminished the quality of indigenous 
schools because there was no comparable state alternative for Muslim families seeking to 
educate their children in Urdu and the local vernacular (Leitner 1991). Although later colonial 
efforts were partially successful in raising Muslim primary school enrollment, Hindu-Muslim 
differences in both secondary school enrollment and literacy persisted till the end of the Raj.  
Why did these differences in enrollment and literacy exist and continue to persist over the 
colonial period? Were the British correct in attributing the differences to the relative poverty of 
Muslims as well as a difference in “educational wants”? Numerous factors may have caused 
these differences. In the following sections we attempt to isolate these factors, employing a 
unique data set of Hindu and Muslim literacy in the early twentieth century.  
III. DATA DESCRIPTION 
For the empirical analysis, we assemble a new dataset merging information from the 
Indian censuses of 1911 and 1921 to data reported in the Indian District Gazetteers. The data 
cover all districts in the provinces of Assam, Bengal, Bihar and Orissa, Bombay, Central 
Province and Berar, Madras, Punjab and United Provinces.8 These provinces jointly account for 
more than 95 percent of the population of British India. We extract data on the social, 
educational, occupational, and developmental structure of each district from the colonial 
censuses and rely on the Indian district gazetteers for the number of schools, pupils, income and 
land tax revenues, and public spending on rural primary education.    
                                                 
8 The analysis excludes the pure urban cities of Bombay, Calcutta and Madras because they were so different 
socially and economically from the largely rural districts of British India. We also exclude the remote North 
Western Frontier Province, Baluchistan, and Burma.  
 
 
8
 Although literacy was enumerated in earlier censuses, we begin in 1911 because the 
definition and enumeration of literates in previous censuses was inconsistent across provinces. 
Beginning in 1911, a uniform definition of literacy was adopted whereby an individual that could 
both read and write in any language was enumerated as literate. Official discussions suggest that 
the definition was clearly understood by the enumerators and the literacy data are considered 
reasonably accurate.9 However, the censuses do note that Muslims were occasionally frustrated 
by this definition because even though they could read certain passages from the Qur’an, the 
enumerators recorded them as illiterate because they could not write.10 We focus on measures of 
total literacy in 1911 and 1921 disaggregated for Hindus and Muslims.11  
In addition to literacy, we use the 1911 and 1921 census to construct measures of 
development such as urban population share, population density, and the district occupational 
structure. Scholars have suggested that some of the smaller occupational categories may be 
inaccurate, and hence we focus on broader categories: the share of the population supported by 
agriculture, commerce, industry, and professionals. Although the census does not report district-
level occupation data by religion, we used the provincial breakdown of occupational categories 
by religion to construct crude district-level measures of the share of Muslims and Hindus 
supported by the four main occupations. This assigns each district within the province the same 
religion-occupation share and we use these controls for robustness checks. We also extracted 
information on the population share of important caste and religious groups: Muslims, 
                                                 
9 In the pre-1911 censuses no specific guidelines were given to enumerators to test for literacy, which led to 
substantial variation in the methods adopted across provinces. Although officials point to certain problems with the 
post-1911 enumeration such as enumerators on occasion adopting school standards, they do indicate, “the simple 
criterion laid down was easily understood and sensibly interpreted” (Census of India 1921, Volume I – Report, 
Chapter VIII). 
10 Although this may lead to measurement error in the Muslim literacy rate data, there is no reason to believe that 
this error would differ in high-Muslim versus low-Muslim districts. If anything, measurement error of this type 
should make it more difficult to find a negative effect of Muslims on Muslim literacy because districts with more 
Muslims were more likely to have Muslim census enumerators that may have been sympathetic to this argument.  
11 We also do robustness checks using gender specific and cohort specific literacy (population aged 10 to 20). 
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Christians, and tribes. Moreover, we constructed a measure of caste and religious fragmentation 
to capture the level of diversity that has been linked to an under-provision of public goods in a 
variety of contexts including British India (Chaudhary 2009a).  
From the district gazetteers, we extracted data on public educational spending by rural 
district boards and income tax revenues.12 Income taxes and district board expenditures were 
missing for several districts in the 1921 cross-section. We used the 1911 income taxes for the 
1921 cross-section in provinces where this data was missing since the variation within provinces 
is similar although the levels may have increased between 1911 and 1921.13 Income taxes are a 
crude proxy of district income and should be interpreted with caution because these taxes were 
levied on a small share of individuals working in the formal sector of the economy. Nonetheless, 
this is the best available local measure of historical income.  
Table 1 reports the summary statistics of the main variables. Hindu and Muslim literacy 
rates as well as the population share of each religion are shown separately by province in the top 
half of the table, while the different socio-economic variables are shown by year in the bottom 
half. Overall literacy was very low in British India both among Hindus and Muslims averaging 
around 7 percent across districts and religions. The variance in literacy, however, was lower 
among Muslims than Hindus. The literacy averages mask the substantial regional variation with 
Muslim literacy ranging from as high as 12 percent in the southern province of Madras to as low 
as 2.6 percent in the northern province of Punjab. Some of this variation is related to the Muslim 
population share. For example, Muslims enjoy above average literacy in provinces where they 
                                                 
12 Rural districts boards were constituted in the early 1880s and managed the provision of local public goods such as 
infrastructure, education, and medical services at the district level.  
13 Likewise, we only use 1911 district board expenditures in the analysis, because public spending changed in this 
decade due to the Montague Chelmsford reforms, which ushered in the period of Dyarchy under which British 
administrators worked alongside elected Indian ministers in provincial legislatures. See Kumar (1982) for an 
overview of the colonial fiscal system.  
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form a smaller share of the population such as Madras and Central Provinces (4.2 and 6.7 percent 
respectively) versus provinces such as Bengal and Punjab where they comprise almost fifty 
percent of the population. We explore this relationship between Hindu-Muslim literacy and their 
respective population shares in more detail in the next section.14 
IV. LITERACY RATES AND RELIGIOUS POPULATION 
The summary statistics shown in Table 1 suggest that the Muslim population share may 
influence Hindu and Muslim literacy. To examine this relationship, we run a baseline regression 
relating the share of the Hindu and Muslim population to Hindu and Muslim literacy in 1911 and 
1921. Table 2 reports the findings for 1911 in the top panel and for 1921 in the bottom panel. It 
is evident that the Muslim population is strongly correlated with the educational performance of 
both Hindus and Muslims. Columns 1 and 2 suggest that a larger proportion of Muslims has a 
positive and statistically significant impact on Hindu literacy but a negative impact on Muslim 
literacy in both cross-sections. A 10 percentage point increase in fraction Muslim is associated 
with a 1 percentage point increase in 1911 Hindu literacy and a 1.4 percentage point decrease in 
1911 Muslim literacy.15 Indeed, Figure 1 suggests that a strong negative relationship exists 
between Muslim literacy and the presence of Muslims.  
To test whether positive regional selection is driving the results on fraction Muslim, 
columns 3 and 4 control for province fixed effects to focus on the within province variation. The 
correlation between fraction Muslim and both Hindu and Muslim literacy remains negative and 
                                                 
14 Similar to literacy, other socio-economic indicators such as urbanization and the share of the commercial 
population are relatively stagnant between 1911 and 1921. Moreover, the low levels of urbanization and 
commercialization highlight the remarkable dominance of agriculture in the early 20th century Indian economy 
(agriculture is the omitted occupational group in the table). 
15 Our results are robust to using negative binomial regressions. We also tested for non-linearity in the relationship 
between literacy and religious population share and found that there is indeed a significant amount of non-linearity – 
the coefficient on the fraction Muslim squared term is frequently positive and significant in regressions where 
Muslim literacy is the dependent variable. We decided not to include these regressions, which are available upon 
request, because they provide a less straight-forward interpretation of the effect of Muslim population on Muslim 
literacy.  
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statistically significant at the 1 percent level.  We find similar patterns on age and gender-
specific literacy.16          
 Why does the presence of Muslims affect literacy? The decision to invest in literacy at an 
individual level involves a simple cost and benefit calculation. If the monetary and non-monetary 
benefits or returns to literacy (higher wages, social status, and so forth) exceed the costs 
(opportunity cost of time, school fees, and the like), then an individual will invest in literacy. 
This decision-making process is a function of individual characteristics such as ability, family 
background, parental education, and social and religious affiliation as well as community or 
district characteristics such as economic conditions and public educational investments. Literacy 
rates at the district-level are thus a function of the aggregate costs and benefits of literacy.   
Given this framework, one obvious explanation of our findings on Muslim literacy is that 
fraction Muslim is capturing some aspect of lower returns to literacy for Muslims. For example, 
if Muslims lived in less developed or poorer districts, then fraction Muslim may just be capturing 
the negative effects of poverty on education. To test whether fraction Muslim is simply a proxy 
for lower returns to Muslim literacy, we include a variety of variables to capture differences in 
the costs and benefits of literacy such as district occupational structure, social heterogeneity, 
income and development. 
Another potential explanation for these patterns is the interaction between colonial 
policies and fraction Muslim. British officials were cognizant of the substantial differences 
between Hindu and Muslim educational outcomes, and they adopted a variety of policies to 
increase enrollment rates and literacy in Muslim dominant districts. As part of these policies, 
Muslim students were eligible for scholarships and reduced fees in public schools, and the 
colonial government established a number of schools in Muslim majority districts (Progress of 
                                                 
16 These results are available upon request.  
 
 
12
Education in India, Quinquennial Reviews, 1897-1927). This suggests that colonial policies 
would make it less likely to find a negative coefficient on the fraction Muslim variable in the 
Muslim literacy regressions because of the larger presence of public schools. 
Table 3 includes our measures of income, development and per-capita public educational 
expenditures by rural district boards as control variables in the regressions. Including these 
controls reduces the coefficient on fraction Muslim by almost 40% in the inter-province 
comparisons, but the magnitudes are not very different in the within province comparisons. The 
results on fraction Muslim also hold for literacy rates disaggregated by gender and the 10 to 20 
aged cohort (available upon request). In other unreported regressions, we controlled for crude 
demographic and occupational differences by religion, and the result relating the presence of 
Muslims to lower literacy remained robust.17 
VI. LITERACY AND LEGITIMACY: THE LASTING EFFECTS OF INSTITUTIONS 
We can draw two important conclusions from the evidence presented thus far. First, a 
larger presence of Muslims negatively influences Muslim literacy but there is no comparable 
effect of Hindus on Hindu literacy. Second, differences in private returns or differences in public 
spending by the colonial government alone are not completely driving these patterns because 
fraction Muslim is negative and statistically significant even after we include public spending 
and various proxies for returns. How then can we explain these patterns? 
                                                 
17 Other than Bengal, the occupational breakdown of Hindus and Muslims is very similar to their share in the 
population. In Bengal, Muslims formed a larger share of agricultural laborers but our results are robust to excluding 
Bengal. Bengal’s occupational differences relate to the historical conversion of Hindus into Islam, which began in 
the early medieval period, with the vast majority of Indian Muslims being converts and not immigrants. Although 
scholars have offered several explanations for the conversions, there is no consensus on the dominant reason for 
conversion (Eaton 2003). For our purpose, negative selection into Islam could bias our results but we address the 
possibility of negative selection into Islam by controlling for province fixed effects and occupational differences 
across districts. Although the regressions do not completely rule out negative selection or low returns as an 
explanation, it appears unlikely that returns or selection alone are driving the fraction Muslim result. 
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In this section, we draw on the institutional history of the rise and fall of Muslim political 
power in India to provide an alternative explanation for the observed patterns. We present a 
theoretical model supported by historical evidence which suggests that Muslim religious 
authorities were stronger and better funded in areas where Muslim political authority had 
recently collapsed, allowing them to better compete with British state schools despite a 
curriculum that was more religious in nature and perhaps less focused on the type of skills that 
promote literacy. 
The poor quality of indigenous religious schools, both Hindu and Muslim, in the early 
20th century is often discussed in the official documents but the specific reasons for their poor 
quality are often debated (Nurullah and Naik 1961). Religious schools may have declined in 
quality due to increased competition for resources (teachers, for example) from the new British 
state schools or perhaps their religious nature rendered them less effective at promoting basic 
literacy. We do not assume that the religious schools were less effective at teaching literacy, but 
instead show that this is an equilibrium outcome. 
An implication of our argument is that there was a strong disincentive for Muslims to 
attain skills that promote literacy in regions where Muslim political collapse happened more 
recently. In these regions, Muslim religious authorities had more influence over the choices of 
the population, and thus the religious schools were on the margin more attractive. In the model, 
we suggest that going to religious school provides some benefit which is increasing in the 
influence of the religious authority. Hence, we suggest that Muslims attained lower literacy in 
areas that collapsed more recently for three reasons: i) religious schools, which were worse at 
promoting literacy than public schools, were more attractive due to the higher level of religious 
capital attained by the religious authorities; ii) religious schools were better funded (via private 
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donations) in areas where religious authorities had more religious capital (namely, those that 
collapsed more recently); iii) religious authorities could increase the portion of the curriculum 
that was religious in these areas – implicitly decreasing the effectiveness of the school with 
regards to literacy – without losing as many students. We suggest that this explains Kozlowski’s 
(1985, p. 64-65) observation: 
In the second half of the nineteenth century … Hindus began to abandon some of 
the traditions of the Mughal elite and enrol (sic) in schools established on the 
British model which concentrated on learning English. … [D]espite the 
competition from “modern” schools, many Muslims continued to send their sons 
to schools which taught the old curriculum by the old methods of recitation and 
memorization. 
 
To shed more light on the causal connections, we model the interactions between the 
relevant players over the period encompassing the height of the Mughal Empire through the 
arrival of the British. Consider a game played between four types of players over many periods. 
The players are a local Muslim religious authority, a Muslim political authority, N local citizenry 
(who are both Hindu and Muslim), and a British authority. The game is played over many 
periods and has five fundamental features: 
1) The Muslim political authority depends on religious authorities for legitimacy 
2) Muslim religious authorities offer education to Muslim citizens 
3) The Muslim political authority stops playing the game in an exogenously determined 
period t1 
4) In period t2 (> t1), the British authority enters the game and offers educational services 
which compete with those offered by the religious authority. The religious authority 
has a local monopoly on educational services in all periods before t2  
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5) Investments in education map onto a probability of attaining literacy based on some 
production function, whose inputs are the degree to which the curriculum is religious, 
the expenditure per student, and the socio-economic conditions of the citizenry 
 
Play Before the Collapse of the Political Authority 
The political authority, religious authority, and citizens play the game for t1 periods. The 
religious authority purchases legitimacy, L, from the religious authority for a transfer Tt, where 
periods are denoted with subscript t. This reflects the fact that Muslim rulers in India, especially 
the Mughals, had roots closely tied to previous Middle Eastern empires, sharing institutions, 
learned languages, ideology, and ruling personnel (Metcalf 1982; Eaton 1993; Kozlowski 1995). 
Like other Islamic rulers, Mughal leadership was based on what Greif (2002) calls “faith-based 
legitimacy”, whereby political rule was legitimate only when it complied with Islamic dictates.18 
This entailed a situation in which Muslim religious authorities had some power vis-à-vis political 
authorities, though the latter dominated for much of the Mughal reign. 
One way that this dynamic manifested itself was through significant grants given to 
religious authorities and institutions by political authorities in order to legitimize their power 
(Habib 1963; Kozlowski 1985, 1995; Eaton 1993). The funding of religious schools has always 
been a legitimizing force in Islam (Kozlowski 1995; Berkey 2007).19 The religious leaders who 
ran these institutions were the primary grantees of the state, and the bestowal of grants (madad-i 
ma’āsh) to religious authorities was so ubiquitous that the grants were eventually named a’imma, 
                                                 
18 Anderson (1993) and Eaton (1993) stress the importance of abiding by Muslim dictates for maintaining legitimacy 
amongst Islamic leaders in India. For more on the role that religious authority has played in legitimizing the state in 
the Islamic world, see Greif (2002), Rubin (2009), Coşgel, Miceli, and Ahmed (2009), and Coşgel, Miceli, and 
Rubin (2009). For more on Hinduism as a legitimizing force in India in Colonial India, see Buultjens (1986). 
19 In addition to mosques, Mughal authorities also supported sufis and shrines, in turn encouraging donations by the 
nobility, gentry, and merchants (Kozlowski 1985). 
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or religious leader. In turn, religious authorities were expected to be the state’s most ardent 
apologists (Habib 1963).20 Kozlowski (1985, p. 22) suggests that Mughal rulers supported 
mosques so that “the name of the sultan was invoked during the Friday prayers, [meaning that] 
Muslims heard weekly a proclamation of their ruler’s piety.” Indeed, the emperor Jahangir 
(1605-1627) called the religious leaders the “Army of Prayer” and reportedly believed that this 
army was as important as his real army (Habib 1963).  
In the model, the political authority also purchases legitimacy from other, un-modeled 
sources such as the military or nobility. Hence, the return from religious legitimacy is a function 
of the fraction of Muslims, m, living in the area – where there are more Muslims, religious 
legitimacy is more effective. In each period, the political authority chooses a transfer Tt to 
maximize its utility: 
(1)                                                          UP = L(Tt, m) – Tt, 
where L1 > 0, L11 < 0, L2 > 0, and L12 > 0. It is straight-forward to see that the optimal transfer, 
T*, is an increasing function of the fraction of Muslims (m). 
Assume that the amount the religious authority spends on educating Muslims is 
increasing in the transfer. The transfer gives the religious authority the ability to accumulate 
"religious capital", Rt, in the community – by allowing it to provide education, build shrines and 
mosques, engage in conspicuous religious consumption, and the like – which is formally defined 
as:21 
(2)                                                      ∑
=
−=
t
j
t
jt
t TR
1
δ , 
                                                 
20 The bestowal of grants varied from emperor to emperor. Akbar significantly reduced the grants available to 
religious authorities, but his successors – Jahangir and more notably Aurangzeb – restored and even expanded many 
of these grants (Habib 1963). 
21 Our definition of religious capital is different than the one employed in Iannaccone (1990), who analyzes religious 
capital in the context of congregations and religious participation. We are concerned with the “capital” accumulated 
by religious authorities as a result of political sponsorship and its provision of educational services. 
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where ( )1,0∈δ  is a depreciation rate.22 
The religious authority derives utility from two different sources: offering religious 
education and attaining religious capital. Its utility from offering schooling is increasing in both 
the number of students choosing the religious school ( RtN ) and the degree to which the 
curriculum is religious (rt). When rt = 1, the curriculum is entirely religious, when  rt = 0, the 
curriculum is entirely secular, and the curriculum is increasingly religious when ( )1,0∈tr . 
Meanwhile, the utility the religious authority receives from religious capital is greater when the 
curriculum is more religious, as a more religious curriculum improves its power vis-à-vis the 
citizenry and the political authority in the present and in the future. In other words, the religious 
authority chooses a curriculum rt to optimize the following: 
(3)                                                         UR = u(rt, RtN ) + w(rt, Rt). 
Where u1 > 0, u2 > 0, u11 < 0, u12 > 0, w1 > 0, w2 > 0, and w12 > 0. 
The inputs into the literacy production function are the amount spent on education per 
citizen, the economic opportunities available to each citizen, and the degree to which the 
curriculum is religious, rt.23 The literacy production function differs for each citizen. Each citizen 
i has economic opportunity, xi,t, which is distributed over some smooth, continuous cdf G(·). The 
return to education is increasing in xi,t. That is, xi,t can be thought of as the socio-economic 
conditions faced by citizen i. The literacy production function, whose inputs are the religiosity of 
the school, the per-student transfer, and the economic opportunities of the citizen, is represented 
                                                 
22 It is possible that religious capital does not always erode over time. Indeed, events such as the Iranian Revolution 
and the contemporary rise of Islamist power in Turkey challenge this idea. However, such events are generally the 
result of investment in religious capital, not some process whereby religious capital accumulates over time 
independent of investment. Our assumption merely entails that, all else being equal, religious capital deteriorates 
over time. 
23 Our model is based on standard assumptions used in the literature on education production functions except for 
the religious curriculum parameter. See Glewwe (2002) for an overview of the education production literature 
pertaining to developing countries. 
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t xN
T
rF ,;, , where F1 < 0, F11 < 0, F2 > 0, F3 > 0, and F13 < 0. The latter condition 
means that people with better socio-economic opportunities receive a greater marginal return 
from a more secular education.24 
Meanwhile, each citizen j chooses a school, { }RBk ,∈ , to maximize an economic return 
(the literacy production function) and a religious return, v(·). B denotes the British school, which 
is not available before period t2, and R is the religious school. That is, citizens choose school k to 
optimize: 
(4)                                                      ( )ktkttik
t
k
tk
t RrvxN
f
rF ,;, , +



, 
where the superscript k denotes the school { }RBk ,∈  in question, f represents the funding 
available to school k (where f = T for the religious school), v1 > 0, v11 < 0, v2 > 0, v12 > 0, v(0, ·) 
= 0, and ktN  is the number of students choosing school k. Assume that, given k
t
k
t
N
f
 (per student 
funding) and ktR  (religious capital), there is some optimal offering of religious curriculum, r*, 
for each citizen. It follows that r* is decreasing in socio-economic opportunity, xi,t.  
Solving this model for periods prior to t1 is straight-forward. All N citizens choose the 
religious school (which is their only option), the religious authority chooses a fully religious 
curriculum r* = 1 in all periods (since citizens choose the religious school no matter the choice 
of the religious authority), and the political authority chooses transfer T* as defined above. For 
simplicity, we ignore the choices made by Hindu citizens through period t2. The results are not 
                                                 
24 One could argue that the assumption that F13 < 0 is an Islam-specific one. Indeed, recent studies suggest that the 
spread of Protestantism (Becker and Woessmann 2008, 2009) and Judaism (Botticini and Eckstein 2005, 2007) 
improved human capital. However, our religious curriculum variable should be interpreted as the portion of the 
curriculum that is religious and thus not directly aimed at increasing non-religious human capital. Our model 
suggests that if this variable is greater in an Islamic setting, this is a result of endogenous processes stemming from 
the institutional setting, not an exogenous attribute of Islam. 
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affected if we were to assume that Hindus attend Muslim schools or they attend some other type 
of (unmodeled) school. 
Play Between the Collapse of the Political Authority and the Arrival of the British 
In period t1 the political authority exits the game. In period t2 (which is after t1), the 
British enter the game. In between these two periods, only the religious authorities and the 
citizens play the game. After t1, the religious authorities receive funding from a small group of 
unmodeled citizens.  Indeed, following the collapse of Muslim rule in India some government 
aid was available to the religious authorities (especially princely grants), but these were often 
small and irregular. In response, religious authorities created networks of local donors whose 
contributions made up a majority of the authorities’ funds (Metcalf 1982, ch. 3).  This donor base 
also allowed the religious authorities to avoid British grant-in-aids, which would have carried the 
taint of a non-Muslim source and would have given the British control over curriculum (Metcalf 
1982, ch.3). This permitted religious learning to remain the core of the curriculum, since the 
British policy of religious neutrality meant that formal religious study was supposed to be 
excluded from instruction in publicly funded schools (Zaman 1999). 
The religious authority's ability to raise funds, w, from this group of citizens is increasing 
in its religious capital, Rt. Assume that w < T for all values of w; that is, the religious authority 
was better funded by the political authority than from the group of citizens. This reflects the fact 
that 
Muslim princes of state …patronize[d] learning…[and] large landlords in the United 
Provinces did dispense some of their wealth for religious causes. But such contributions 
could never be as substantial as those of the days of Mughal rule, nor could they be as 
certain in a period of economic, social, and administrative flux…Instead they created a 
network of donors who formed a base … for financial support (Metcalf 1982, p. 96-97). 
 
The religious capital accrued by the religious authority in these periods is: 
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The literacy production function of the religious school is 
( )




tiR
t
t
t xN
Rw
rF ,;, . In equilibrium, all 
Muslim citizens choose the religious school and the religious authority chooses r* = 1 in all 
periods. Again, we ignore the school choice of Hindus in these periods. 
Play After the Arrival of the British 
In period t2 the British enter the game, which is played until some end period t . The 
British offer a secular school that competes with the religious school, which still receives 
funding w(Rt). That is, the British offer a school where rt = 0. The British provide bt funds to 
support the school. Although this is a simplifying assumption since purely public state schools 
funded by the British functioned alongside public-private schools (i.e. aided schools), the public-
private schools did receive public grants to cover up to half of their operating expenditure. This 
entails that the literacy production function of the British school is 



tiB
t
t x
N
b
F ,;,0 , where 
B
tN  is 
the number of students attending the British school. 
For simplicity, assume that all Hindu citizens (fraction 1 – m) attend the British school.25 
Muslim citizens choose between attending the British school and the religious school. The utility 
derived by Muslims from attending the British school is merely the production function 




tiB
t
t x
N
b
F ,;,0 , since there is no religious return, and ( ) MBtBt NNmN ,1 +−=  where MBtN ,  
denotes the number of Muslims choosing the British school. On the other hand, the return for 
                                                 
25 This is merely a simplifying assumption. Clearly, not all Hindus attended school and some Hindus attended 
private schools. Incorporating these facts does not change the implications of the model. 
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Muslims from attending the religious school is 
( ) ( )tttiR
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rF ,;, , +



. That is, for a given 
level of rt, BtN , and 
R
tN  (assuming that 
B
tN  and 
R
tN  are large enough that citizens have an 
infinitesimal effect on the production function), a Muslim citizen i chooses the British school if: 
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. 
Assume that an internal equilibrium exists; that is, 0>BtN and 0>RtN . In equilibrium, 
the production function condition F13 < 0 entails that there must be some threshold socio-
economic value x* such that all citizens with xi,t ≥ x* choose the British school and all citizens 
with xi,t < x* choose the religious school. This entails that for the marginal citizen (defined as the 
citizen whose socio-economic condition is xi,t = x*), the left-hand side of (6) equals the right 
hand side. The equilibrium condition is ( ) BtRt NNNxNG −==* , where G(·) is the cdf over which 
xi,t is distributed. 
It is clear that x* is decreasing in the amount of funds provided by the British, bt. The 
relationship between x* and rt (the religiosity of the curriculum) is a little more complicated. At 
sufficiently small levels of rt , x* is increasing in rt; an increase in rt means that the religious 
school becomes more attractive since the increase in the religious return, v(rt, Rt), is greater than 
the decrease in the literacy production function. This is the case when rt is smaller than r* (the 
optimal offering of religious curriculum) for the marginal citizen. On the other hand, when rt > 
r* for the marginal citizen, x* is decreasing in rt. Finally, the relationship between x* and 
fraction of Muslims in the population (m) depends on the level of m, as an increase in m 
decreases the number of Hindus attending British schools (thus increasing the returns for 
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Muslims) but also increases Rt (the religious capital) and thus increase the returns for Muslims 
from attending religious schools. 
Under reasonable assumptions on G(·) and F(·), there is an internal optimal choice of 
religiosity of the curriculum (rt) for the religious authority, call  it r**. This optimal choice is less 
than in previous periods (where the religious authority chose a fully religious curriculum at r* = 
1), meaning that competition from British schools improves the quality of the religious schools 
with respect to literacy, although the religious schools do offer a differentiated, more religious, 
product. Finally, after taking into account the religious authority's decision, it is clear that x* is 
increasing in Rt. 
Analysis and Testable Predictions 
What does this model tell us in the context of colonial India? We are concerned with how 
the interactions between the players affect literacy outcomes in the final period of the model, t , 
which can interpreted as the period our data covers (1911 and 1921). These interactions provide 
testable predictions spelled out below. 
Before summarizing the predictions, note that in equilibrium the British schools must be 
more effective at promoting literacy than the Muslim schools. To see this, consider the case 
where this is not true. If Muslim schools were more effective at promoting literacy, then all 
Muslims would choose the religious school. This cannot be an equilibrium, however, because if 
all Muslims choose the religious schools, then the religious authority has incentive to increase 
the religiosity of the curriculum (rt) at least up to the point where the Muslim with the best socio-
economic opportunity (xi,t) is indifferent between the religious and the British school. At this 
point, the British school must be more effective at promoting literacy, since the indifferent 
citizen receives a religious return from attending the religious school. Moreover, this logic must 
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also hold at greater levels of rt, since citizens do not view their decision as affecting the literacy 
production function of the schools. 
In other words, the outcome that British schools promoted literacy to a greater extent than 
religious schools is endogenously derived in the model, following from the assumption that 
religious citizens place some positive weight on a religious curriculum. And indeed, although in 
reality the curriculum of the religious schools varied widely throughout India, anecdotal 
evidence suggests that these schools encouraged the ability to read and write to a lesser extent 
than the public schools established by colonial authorities. One reason commonly given for this 
is the significance of oral transmission in Islamic history (the most important means by which 
religious scholars maintained their monopoly on knowledge [Eaton 1993; Berkey 2007]), which 
encouraged many of these schools to promote Qur’an memorization and recitation of other 
religious sciences instead of skills associated with literacy (Kozlowski 1985).26 In fact, Eaton 
(1993, p. 296) provides anecdotal evidence that many Indian mullas themselves could not read, 
but that they were understood by the villagers to be tapping into a deeper, otherworldly source of 
power.  
The following predictions thus arise from the model: 
Prediction #1: All else being equal, if the education expenditure by the British (bt) is sufficiently 
larger than the funding of the religious schools (w), then the fraction of Muslims in the 
population (m) is negatively correlated with the Muslim literacy rate. 
                                                 
26 This by no means entails that all Islamic schools discouraged literacy or even those that did never offered 
anything in the curriculum which would promote literacy. Indeed, Metcalf (1982), Kozlowski (1985), and Zaman 
(1999) show instances of Islamic schools which promoted literacy. However, on the margin, the probability of a 
student becoming literate who attended a public funded school must have been greater than one who attended an 
Islamic school, for reasons provided above. For example, the British formed the ill-fated Delhi College in 1825 
because the private madrasahs spent too much time on the Qur’an and there was no regular system of attendance 
(Metcalf 1982). The British did sponsor some madrasahs, as long as the content of the curriculum was deemed 
sufficiently “useful” (Zaman 1999). 
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Intuition: A sufficient condition for this prediction to hold is that the British school is better 
funded than the religious school. Indeed, state schools on average were of much higher quality 
with respect to infrastructure and instructors. Although there were informal public aided and 
unaided schools run out of teachers’ houses or local temples, many of the pure public schools 
had buildings. Moreover, many teachers in the public schools attended special training schools 
before entry into teaching. The state schools were regularly reviewed to ensure they met some 
satisfactory standards. In comparison, the indigenous schools were never reviewed and official 
authorities had a difficult time even getting basic statistics on enrollment. By the early 20th 
century, less than 10 percent of total pupils were enrolled in any of these schools. Both official 
accounts and the historical literature suggest that by the early 20th century, religious schools were 
of poor quality relative to the state schools (Quinquennial Reviews of Education, 1887-1927; 
Nurullah and Naik 1961; Ghosh 2000). 
To see why Prediction #1 holds, consider what happens to the equilibrium actions when 
the fraction of Muslims (m) is increased by an infinitesimal amount. The direct effect is that the 
funding for the religious school, w(Rt), and the citizens’ “religious return”, v(rt, Rt), increase, thus 
increasing the attractiveness and the productivity (with respect to literacy) of the religious 
school. Meanwhile, the fraction of Hindus decreases, so the British schools spend more per 
citizen and are hence more productive. 
The religious authority, however, has incentive to increase the degree to which the 
curriculum is religious (rt) to a point where the religious school is worse for literacy than it was 
before the increase in the fraction Muslim, m. To see this, consider the situation in which the 
religious authority increases rt to the point where literacy is the same before and after the 
increase in m. When British funding (bt) is sufficiently large, the increase in fraction Muslim 
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entails that the religious return to attending the religious school, v(rt, Rt), increases by more than 
the return from attending the British school. Thus, more students attend the religious school and 
the religious authority has incentive to increase rt further, and both of these factors result in the 
religious schools being worse for literacy after the increase in m (since there is less funding per 
student and the curriculum is more religious). Although Muslim citizens who remain in the 
British school after the increase in m have a higher probability of becoming literate, the rest of 
the Muslim citizens have a lower probability of becoming literate – both those who switch from 
the British to the religious school and those who were in the religious school before and after the 
change in m. If the education expenditure by the British is sufficiently large, then the latter effect 
outweighs the former and m is negatively correlated with the Muslim literacy rate. In other 
words, this prediction entails that “fraction Muslim” should be negatively correlated with 
Muslim literacy, but not necessarily due to any cultural reason of anything to do with the “nature 
of Islam”.27 Instead, the correlation between fraction Muslim and Muslim literacy may be 
spurious, as they may be related through the presence of historical Muslim educational 
institutions and the collapse of Muslim rule. 
Prediction #2: All else being equal, if the education expenditure by the British (bt) is sufficiently 
larger than the funding of the religious schools (w), then the Muslim literacy rate is 
positively correlated with the years (periods) since the collapse of the Muslim political 
authority ( t - t1). 
Intuition: Where Muslim collapse happens more distantly in the past, it is longer since Muslim 
religious authorities played a legitimizing role. This, in turn, decreases the religious authority’s 
                                                 
27 It should be noted that the model cannot rule out culture as a determining factor in differential literacy rates. 
However, as we suggest below, a purely cultural argument is tough to reconcile with regression results indicating 
that the coefficient on “fraction Muslim” is greatly weakened and often insignificant after the period of Muslim 
collapse is controlled for. 
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capital within the district as well as the funding bestowed on it by political authorities. As a 
result, religious schools should be weaker in these areas and less able to compete with British 
schools, which provided a stronger secular, but not religious, curriculum. 
In terms of the model, religious capital (Rt) is decreasing in the number of periods since 
the collapse of the political authority under the assumption that the transfer given by the political 
authority, Tt, is greater than that given by the citizenry, w(Rt). Moreover, the degree of 
depreciation of religious capital is increasing in the number of periods since the collapse of 
political authority. 
A decrease in religious capital (Rt) has a few effects related to literacy. First, it 
encourages some Muslims to choose the British school, as the religious schools are now less 
funded and the religious return, v(rt, Rt), is lower. Literacy for these citizens is thus increased. 
However, Muslims who were already in the British school now get less funding, so their 
probability of becoming literate decreases. Meanwhile, the Muslims who remain in the Muslim 
school have a more poorly funded school, and thus have a lower probability of literacy. The 
positive effects on literacy outweigh the negative effects when the British school is sufficiently 
well-funded, as those already in the British school will not have their probability of becoming 
literate greatly reduced but those moving to the British school have a significant increase in their 
probability of becoming literate. This entails that the Muslim literacy rate is positively associated 
with the number of periods since the collapse of the Muslim political authority. 
In sum, this model proposes that the share of Muslims in the population may be 
spuriously correlated with Muslim literacy. Instead of relying on a purely cultural argument, the 
model suggests the possibility that religious schools were more attractive in regions where 
religious authorities accumulated more religious capital in the past. These regions are often ones 
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with a greater portion of Muslims (since this enticed Muslim rulers to purchase more legitimacy 
from religious authorities) and a more recent collapse of Muslim political authority (since 
religious authorities received more funding in such regions). It follows that religious authorities 
may have been able to increase the degree to which the religious school's curriculum was based 
on religion in these areas, thus diminishing the productivity of religious schools in promoting 
literacy. It also encouraged more Muslims to enter the religious schools instead of the British 
schools – diminishing Muslim literacy.28 
Empirical Analysis 
The argument presented in the model may help explain the finding that the Muslim 
literacy rate is negatively associated with the presence of other Muslims. First, there is evidence 
that regions with a more recent collapse of Mughal rule had larger Muslim populations. Districts 
where Muslim rule collapsed before 1765 had a mean Muslim proportion of 21.3%, those where 
Muslim rule collapsed between 1765-1805 had a mean Muslim proportion of 21.7%, while those 
with a post-1805 collapse had a mean Muslim proportion of 34.2%. This suggests the possibility 
that the coefficient on fraction Muslim in our previous regressions is merely a proxy for the 
historical circumstance in which a recent collapse of Muslim rule entailed worse literacy for 
Muslims. 
                                                 
28 Concerns with this model may include the number of years (or periods) before Muslim collapse is not endogenous 
or that the fraction of Muslims in the population is not endogenous. The former may be endogenous because Muslim 
political authorities were stronger where there were more Muslims and thus had a lower probability of collapse 
where m was large. The latter may be endogenous because poor socio-economic opportunities (xi,t) may have 
convinced some poor Hindus to convert to Islam, which was not encumbered by the rigid caste system. However, 
endogenizing either of these phenomena would merely exacerbate the results enumerated above. The model predicts 
that the fraction of Muslims in the population and "late collapse" are both negatively correlated with the Muslim 
literacy rate. Hence, making the collapse date (t1) an increasing function of the fraction of Muslims in the population 
(m) would merely strengthen Predictions #1 and #2. Moreover, if Hindus in poor socio-economic conditions 
converted to Islam, then this should exacerbate prediction #1, since poor socio-economic conditions are assumed to 
be negatively correlated with literacy (F3 > 0). That is, if the distribution of socio-economic conditions is more 
skewed to the left for Muslims than Hindus, this means that we should see worse literacy rates where there are more 
Muslims, although for a different reason than the one proposed in the model. On the other hand, if Hindus with good 
socio-economic conditions converted to Islam, then the results of the model may change under some parameter sets. 
However, our data shows little evidence of this type of selection. 
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Can the differential timing in the collapse of Muslim rule across different parts of India 
pick up any variation that we are not already picking up in the previous regressions? Throughout 
the eighteenth and into the nineteenth century, Muslim power collapsed in different places in the 
subcontinent. The Mughal Empire was greatly weakened by the early eighteenth century 
(especially after the death of Aurangzeb in 1707) and by the mid-eighteenth century was 
replaced by a combination of Muslim successor states, Hindu kingdoms (most prominently the 
Marathas) and the British East India Company.29 The first watershed event of British intrusion 
occurred at the Battle of Plessey (1757), which was followed by the formal secession of Mughal 
lands to the East India Company in Bengal and Bihar in 1765 (Datta 2003; Banerjee and Iyer 
2005).  Prior to 1765, Muslim rule collapsed not only in Bengal and Bihar but also to the 
Maratha kingdom in parts of the northern and eastern areas of India (in parts of Orissa, Central 
Provinces, Bombay, and Punjab). 
The British expanded little in the decades following the accession of Bengal and Bihar. 
From 1790-1805, however, the British nearly doubled their holdings in India, especially under 
the aggressive tenure of Richard Wellesley (1798-1805), attaining much of Madras, Orissa, and 
the United Provinces (Ward 1994; Datta 2003). In 1765-1805, Muslim rule also collapsed in 
Punjab, falling under Sikh rule. Following British expansion under Wellesley, the British did not 
gain more territory for over a decade (Banerjee and Iyer 2005), but by the mid-19th century 
Muslim rule collapsed in the northern and western areas, including the United Provinces, Central 
Provinces, and Sind (which would become a part of northwestern Bombay province in 1843) 
(Robinson 1982). The map presented in Figure 2 details when and where Muslim rule collapsed 
throughout the subcontinent. 
                                                 
29 There is a substantial literature speculating on the reasons underlying the decline of the Mughal Empire. We have 
no intention on entering this debate. For more, see Habib (1963), Pearson (1976), and Leonard (1979). 
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We exploit the significant variation in the date of collapse both within and across 
provinces to test the implications of the argument spelled out above. We construct a dummy 
variable for the three periods of Muslim collapse associated with different periods of British 
intrusion, as delineated by Robinson (1982, p. 59, 113): pre-1765, 1765-1805, and post-1805.30 
Table 4 reports the findings on Hindu and Muslim literacy controlling for the collapse dummies 
and the set of socio-economic variables used in Table 3.  The omitted collapse dummy is the pre-
1765 dummy, so all coefficients should be interpreted relative to districts in which Mughal 
power collapsed prior to 1765.  
A number of patterns emerge in Table 4. First, the fraction Muslim coefficient is 
insignificant in all of the regressions in Table 4 where Muslim literacy is the dependent variable, 
indicating that including controls for the period of Muslim collapse may pick up what fraction 
Muslim picked up in previous regressions. Second, the coefficients on the dummies for our 
Muslim collapse variables are negative and significant in all Muslim literacy regressions and the 
post-1805 collapse dummy is always more negative than the 1765-1805 dummy. This suggests 
that a more recent collapse is negatively associated with Muslim literacy. All else being equal, a 
post-1805 collapse of Muslim power entails between a 1.4 and 3.8 percentage point drop in 
Muslim literacy (relative to a pre-1765 collapse). This difference is far from trivial, as mean 
literacy rates hovered around six to seven percent in this period. The collapse dummies, 
however, are rarely significant in regressions on Hindu literacy, especially when province fixed 
effects are employed. This result suggests that the effect of late collapse does not simply hurt all 
                                                 
30 These breakpoints separate dates of major British intrusion into India. It is possible that the British expanded to 
the most economically profitable areas first, meaning that the collapse dummies are also proxying for income 
instead of just the institutional relationship suggested by the model. However, this potential problem should not 
affect our results. Stokes (1973) argues that the British expanded after 1765 to gain control and increase the 
efficiency of the tax system, which was defunct in much of the continent. Moreover, another exogenous source of 
heterogeneity is that the British were not the only non-Muslim group taking Muslim lands – Hindus and Sikhs also 
siphoned off much of what has once been the Mughal Empire. 
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types of literacy (through some mechanism not controlled for), but only Muslim literacy (as 
predicted by the model).  
Our model suggests that the effects of Muslim collapse operated through a larger 
presence of religious schools in districts where Muslim rule collapsed more recently and a 
smaller presence of state schools created under colonial authority. Although the censuses do not 
provide any information on the number of schools in a district, we have pieced together some 
data from the Indian district gazetteers on total schools, state schools established under the new 
British education system (namely public, aided and unaided schools), and indigenous private 
schools. Most of the Muslim religious schools were enumerated under the indigenous schools but 
unfortunately the data on religious indigenous schools is not differentiated by religion, which 
introduces significant measurement error. Moreover, we only have this data for districts of 
Bengal, Bihar and Orissa, Bombay, Madras, and Punjab in 1911.  
Using this crude data, Table 5 provides some suggestive evidence that districts where 
Muslim rule collapsed in the early 19th century (late collapse) had fewer total schools, especially 
fewer schools established under colonial authority (state schools). This result arises in spite of 
the result that, as colonial policy dictated, areas with more Muslims had more public schools and 
more total schools. There is also mild evidence that areas with a later collapse had a larger 
number of unrecognized religious schools but the effects are not precisely estimated (columns 5 
and 6). Since we have limited variation in the timing of collapse within provinces – most of the 
intra-province variation on collapse occurs within Punjab, Bombay, Central Provinces, and 
United Provinces, and we only have data for the former two – the effects of collapse are 
imprecisely estimated in the province fixed effects regressions although the signs on the 
coefficients are generally in the direction we expect.   
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The collapse dummies are an admittedly crude proxy for the pathway by which the 
legitimizing relationship between religious and political authorities ultimately culminated in the 
propagation of religious schools, which discouraged literacy. There are numerous cultural, 
economic, religious, and military phenomena associated with the collapse of Muslim power that 
are not associated with the pathway proposed in the model. Yet, for such phenomena to have had 
a salient impact on Muslim literacy, one would have to explain why it affected only Muslim 
literacy and not Hindu literacy, as is suggested by Table 4. We view the use of this proxy as a 
successful first-order attempt at showing that broader, institutional features may underlie the 
diverging paths of human capital accumulation between groups rather than purely cultural 
factors. Though there are other ways that “Muslim collapse” may have affected literacy rates in 
the early 20th century, we believe that the institutional pathway that we propose in the model is 
the most reasonable one.  
VII. BROADER SIGNIFICANCE 
Although our analysis focuses on the colonial period, differences in Hindu and Muslim 
literacy have continued to persist into the post-independence period. As of the 2001 census, 
Muslim literacy averaged 59% compared to an all-India average of 65% (Government of India, 
2006).31  Moreover, states with a larger share of Muslims appear to have lower Muslim literacy 
as compared to states with smaller Muslim populations. Of course, the Indian subcontinent 
witnessed numerous changes over the 20th century including independence from colonial rule in 
1947, the Partition of India and creation of Pakistan, and the large-scale migration of Muslims 
from India to Pakistan. On account of these changes, we are hesitant to completely attribute the 
differential literacy patterns observed in post-independent India to institutional channels dating 
                                                 
31 Estimates from the National Sample Survey Organization (NSSO) find larger differences in 2004-05: Muslim 
literacy rate of 60% compared to 80% for Hindus. 
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to the collapse of Muslim rule. Our institutional pathway, however, may be one of many factors 
responsible for the observed variation in Muslim literacy within post-independence India.  
While our focus in this paper has been on the Indian experience, we believe our findings 
and model may also be relevant beyond India. A crude examination of literacy rates across the 
world reveals a very small negative correlation between the proportion of Muslims and total 
literacy rates (Appendix Table 1). But, when we break up countries by regions, the correlation is 
negative and larger in magnitude for Asia and Africa but not for the Middle East. The correlation 
is also sensitive to whether we break up the sample according to the Muslim population share. 
Ideally, we would like to compare Muslim literacy rates to the proportion of Muslims across 
countries. However, there are no systematic data on Muslim literacy by country making it 
difficult to say whether Muslims or some other group are contributing to the higher total literacy 
rate in countries with smaller shares of Muslims. Nonetheless, we believe our model and 
mechanism could explain inter-group literacy differences in other countries in Asia or Africa, 
where colonial rule supplanted existing political institutions that relied on religious authorities 
for legitimacy.  
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Differences in human capital accumulation are vital components of differences in broader 
economic outcomes both across countries and across different groups within the same country. In 
this paper, we attempt to shed light on the conditions under which Muslims (a minority group) 
attained less human capital than Hindus (the majority group) in early 20th century India. Are the 
factors leading to these differences cultural, institutional, demographic, or something else? 
Our baseline specifications suggest that Muslim literacy rates are negatively associated 
with the presence of other Muslims in the district. This result is robust to social, economic, and 
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educational controls, although adding these controls slightly weakens the result. We argue that 
the institutional history of the region played a role in discouraging literacy amongst Muslims. 
Our analysis suggests that this history did indeed play a salient role in determining literacy rates, 
and that the difference between Hindu and Muslim literacy in the early 20th century may have 
been an unintended result of the differential timing of the collapse of Muslim political power. 
In sum, we view our paper as a first step in understanding the factors which affect human 
capital accumulation across different groups. We offer an alternative to cultural explanations that 
rely on the argument, “where there are more Muslims, there are worse economic outcomes.” We 
show that controlling for socio-economic variables and particularly institutional variables helps 
eliminate the effect of the presence of Muslims on Muslim literacy. More broadly, this analysis 
suggests that the “long hand of history” has played some role in subsequent differences in 
literacy rates through the persistence of institutions discouraging literacy. 
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TABLES 
TABLE 1: SUMMARY STATISTICS 
              
  Hindu Muslim 
Variable Obs. Mean Std Dev Obs Mean Std Dev 
              
Literacy Rate 410 7.4% 5.6% 396 6.8% 5.2% 
Assam 16 7.0% 2.0% 13 5.2% 3.2% 
Bengal 54 11.9% 3.5% 52 5.8% 2.8% 
Bihar and Orissa 42 4.5% 1.4% 38 5.9% 3.8% 
Bombay and Sind 49 9.2% 5.6% 49 8.3% 5.7% 
Central Provinces 44 4.3% 1.4% 39 11.9% 4.2% 
Madras 50 8.3% 4.7% 50 12.3% 6.1% 
Punjab 59 11.5% 9.1% 59 2.6% 3.4% 
United Provinces 96 3.6% 1.5% 96 4.6% 2.8% 
Population Share 410 69.7% 27.3% 410 23.6% 26.2% 
Assam 16 64.9% 13.3% 16 20.4% 18.9% 
Bengal 54 46.0% 23.1% 54 47.4% 26.5% 
Bihar and Orissa 42 81.2% 17.3% 42 9.0% 8.5% 
Bombay and Sind 49 71.1% 29.3% 49 25.9% 30.3% 
Central Provinces 44 80.7% 13.2% 44 4.2% 2.7% 
Madras 50 89.0% 7.6% 50 6.7% 6.3% 
Punjab 59 33.1% 26.5% 59 55.8% 26.7% 
United Provinces 96 85.3% 8.6% 96 13.7% 8.0% 
              
  1911 1921 
              
Hindu Literacy Rate 204 7.1% 6.2% 206 7.7% 5.0% 
Muslim Literacy Rate 195 6.2% 4.8% 201 7.3% 5.6% 
Fraction Hindu 204 69.9% 27.2% 206 69.4% 27.4% 
Fraction Brahman 204 5.0% 4.3% 206 5.0% 4.3% 
Fraction Low Castes 204 15.8% 8.1% 206 14.5% 8.3% 
Fraction Muslim 204 23.2% 26.2% 206 23.9% 26.3% 
Fraction Christian 204 1.0% 2.0% 206 1.2% 2.2% 
Fraction Tribes 204 3.7% 9.5% 206 3.3% 8.5% 
Caste and Religious Fragmentation 204 0.74 0.18 206 0.73 0.19 
              
Fraction Urban 204 9.9% 10.5% 206 10.9% 11.5% 
Fraction Commercial 204 7.0% 3.6% 206 6.7% 3.2% 
Fraction Industry 204 12.2% 6.3% 206 11.6% 6.4% 
Fraction Professionals 204 1.6% 0.9% 206 1.6% 1.2% 
              
Income Tax Revenues per-capita 200 0.06 0.10 200 0.20 0.64 
              
Source: Census of India (1911 and 1921) and Imperial District Gazetteer Series (income tax revenues per-capita variable).  
See text for more details on dataset. 
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TABLE 2: TOTAL LITERACY RATES 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
  Hindu Muslim   Hindu Muslim 
1911 CROSS-SECTION 
Fraction Hindu -0.056* -0.047   -0.054* -0.036 
  [0.030] [0.032]   [0.028] [0.030] 
Fraction Muslim 0.095*** -0.141***   0.085*** -0.126*** 
  [0.020] [0.033]   [0.023] [0.028] 
            
Province FE No No   Yes Yes 
            
Observations 204 195   204 195 
Adj. R-squared 0.39 0.28   0.45 0.50 
            
1921 CROSS-SECTION 
Fraction Hindu 0.001 -0.073*   0.009 -0.025 
  [0.013] [0.037]   [0.015] [0.030] 
Fraction Muslim 0.127*** -0.184***   0.124*** -0.135*** 
  [0.015] [0.038]   [0.017] [0.028] 
            
Province FE No No   Yes Yes 
            
Observations 206 201   206 201 
Adj. R-squared 0.43 0.30   0.59 0.52 
            
Robust standard errors in brackets, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
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TABLE 3: CAN LOW RETURNS OR COLONIAL POLICIES EXPLAIN THE 
PATTERNS? 
TOTAL LITERACY RATES 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
  Hindu Muslim   Hindu Muslim 
1911 CROSS-SECTION 
Fraction Hindu -0.047 0.079***   -0.049 -0.003 
  [0.175] [0.029]   [0.177] [0.035] 
Fraction Muslim 0.015 -0.077*   0.011 -0.141*** 
  [0.161] [0.042]   [0.169] [0.049] 
            
Observations 189 185   189 185 
Adj. R-squared 0.52 0.56   0.51 0.66 
            
1921 CROSS-SECTION 
Fraction Hindu 0.051 0.039   0.018 -0.015 
  [0.055] [0.029]   [0.051] [0.040] 
Fraction Muslim 0.116* -0.135***   0.072 -0.180*** 
  [0.064] [0.047]   [0.059] [0.054] 
            
Observations 187 186   187 186 
Adj. R-squared 0.75 0.58   0.80 0.68 
            
            
Province FE No No   Yes Yes 
Education Expenditures Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
Social Controls Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
Development Controls Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
            
Robust standard errors in brackets, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
Social controls include the population share of christians, tribes, buddhists and CRFI. Development controls 
include income taxes per-capita, urbanization rate, a dummy for coastal districts, population share supported by 
commerce, population share supported by industry and population share supported by professionals. We 
control for public educational expenditures per-capita incurred by the rural district boards in all the 
specifications.  
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TABLE 4: DOES YEARS SINCE MUGHAL COLLAPSE AFFECT LITERACY? 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
  Hindu Muslim   Hindu Muslim 
1911 CROSS-SECTION 
Fraction Hindu -0.059 0.106***   -0.091 0.045 
  [0.183] [0.030]   [0.206] [0.043] 
Fraction Muslim 0.003 -0.042   -0.042 -0.080 
  [0.168] [0.042]   [0.202] [0.059] 
1765-1805 Collapse 0.008 -0.015**   0.016 -0.014* 
  [0.010] [0.006]   [0.018] [0.007] 
Post-1805 Collapse 0.003 -0.025***   0.014 -0.023*** 
  [0.007] [0.005]   [0.011] [0.008] 
            
Observations 186 182   186 182 
Adj. R-squared 0.52 0.59   0.51 0.67 
            
1921 CROSS-SECTION 
Fraction Hindu 0.074 0.102***   0.007 0.061 
  [0.057] [0.033]   [0.053] [0.043] 
Fraction Muslim 0.150** -0.052   0.059 -0.077 
  [0.066] [0.049]   [0.063] [0.061] 
1765-1805 Collapse -0.011** -0.024***   0.001 -0.022*** 
  [0.005] [0.006]   [0.006] [0.008] 
Post-1805 Collapse -0.013*** -0.035***   0.005 -0.038*** 
  [0.005] [0.006]   [0.006] [0.009] 
            
Observations 184 183   184 183 
Adj. R-squared 0.78 0.64   0.81 0.70 
            
            
Province FE No No   Yes Yes 
Education Expenditures Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
Social Controls Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
Development Controls Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
            
Robust standard errors in brackets, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
Social and development controls are same as in table 3. Collapse dummies equal one if Mughal rule 
collapsed in the period. 
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TABLE 5: FEWER STATE SCHOOLS AND MUSLIM COLLAPSE 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6)   
  
Total Schools 
  All State Schools 
(Public, Aided and 
Unaided) 
  Unrecognized 
Indigeneous 
Schools 
  
  
    
  
                    
Fraction Hindu 2.184*** 0.849**   1.940*** 0.427   0.244 0.422***   
  [0.441] [0.374]   [0.464] [0.324]   [0.155] [0.145]   
Fraction Muslim 1.677*** 0.274   1.525** -0.269   0.152 0.542***   
  [0.598] [0.556]   [0.607] [0.505]   [0.186] [0.170]   
1765-1805 Collapse -0.107* -0.037   -0.154*** -0.047   0.047** 0.011   
  [0.060] [0.063]   [0.056] [0.056]   [0.021] [0.021]   
Post-1805 Collapse -0.266*** -0.036   -0.313*** -0.016   0.047 -0.020   
  [0.087] [0.088]   [0.074] [0.078]   [0.039] [0.036]   
                    
Province FE No Yes   No Yes   No Yes   
Social Controls Yes Yes   Yes Yes   Yes Yes   
Income Controls Yes Yes   Yes Yes   Yes Yes   
Development Controls Yes Yes   Yes Yes   Yes Yes   
                    
Observations 120 120   120 120   120 120   
Adjusted R-squared 0.42 0.57   0.45 0.63   0.28 0.46   
                    
Robust standard errors in brackets, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1           
Source: Data for 1911 cross-section only. Specifications on public schools and recognized private schools are for districts in 
Bengal, Bihar and Orissa, Bombay, Madras and Punjab. This data was unreported for the other provinces. Social controls include 
the population share of christians, tribes, buddhists and CRFI. Development controls include income taxes per-capita, urbanization 
rate, a dummy for coastal districts, population share supported by commerce, population share supported by industry and 
population share supported by professionals. 
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FIGURES 
 
FIGURE 1: FRACTION MUSLIM VS. MUSLIM LITERACY RATE 
0
.0
5
.1
.1
5
.2
.2
5
M
us
lim
 L
ite
ra
cy
 R
at
e,
 1
91
1
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Fraction Muslim, 1911
 
 
44
 
FIGURE 2: COLLAPSE OF MUSLIM RULE IN INDIA 
 
 
Source: Robinson (1982) 
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Country Literacy Rate
Fraction 
Muslim
Literacy Data 
Year
Africa (correlation = -0.17)
Algeria 75.39 98.0 2007
Benin 40.54 24.4 2007
Burkina Faso 28.73 59.0 2007
Cameroon 67.90 17.9 2001
Central African Republic 48.57 8.9 2000
Chad 31.76 55.8 2007
Comoros 77.28 98.3 2007
Cote d'Ivoire 48.73 36.7 2000
Egypt 66.37 94.6 2006
Eritrea 52.51 36.5 2002
Ethiopia 35.90 33.9 2004
Gabon 86.17 9.5 2007
Ghana 65.03 15.9 2007
Guinea 29.48 84.4 2003
Kenya 73.61 7.0 2000
Liberia 55.55 12.2 2007
Libya 86.78 96.6 2007
Malawi 71.79 12.8 2007
Mali 26.18 92.5 2006
Mauritania 55.80 99.1 2007
Mauritius 87.41 16.6 2007
Morocco 55.58 99.0 2007
Mozambique 44.38 22.8 2007
Niger 28.67 98.6 2005
Nigeria 72.01 50.4 2007
Senegal 41.89 96.0 2006
Sierra Leone 38.10 71.3 2007
Sudan 60.93 71.3 2000
Tanzania 72.31 30.2 2007
Togo 53.16 12.2 2000
Tunisia 77.70 99.5 2007
Uganda 73.60 12.1 2007
Middle East (correlation = 0.09)
Bahrain 88.8 81.2 2007
Iran 82.3 99.4 2006
Iraq 74.1 16.7 2000
Jordan 91.1 98.2 2005
Kuwait 94.5 95.0 2007
Lebanon 89.6 59.3 2007
Oman 84.4 87.7 2007
Qatar 93.1 77.5 2007
Saudi Arabia 85.0 97.0 2007
Syria 83.1 92.2 2007
United Arab Emirates 90.0 76.2 2005
Yemen 58.9 99.1 2007
Asia (correlation = -0.26)
Afghanistan 28.00 99.7 2000
Azerbaijan 99.50 99.2 2007
Bangladesh 53.48 89.6 2007
Brunei 94.9 67.2 2007
India 66.02 13.4 2007
Indonesia 91.98 88.2 2006
Kazakhstan 99.62 56.4 2007
Kyrgyz Republic 99.30 86.3 2007
Mongolia 97.77 5.0 2007
Pakistan 54.15 96.3 2006
Philippines 93.57 5.1 2007
Russia 99.52 11.7 2007
Singapore 94.43 14.9 2007
Sri Lanka 90.81 8.5 2006
Tajikistan 99.64 84.1 2007
Thailand 94.15 5.8 2007
Turkey 88.7 98.0 2007
Turkmenistan 99.51 93.1 2007
Uzbekistan 96.90 96.3 2000
APPENDIX TABLE 1
Source: Countries with at least 5% Muslim population (min 100,000); Population from Pew 
Research Center (2009); Literacy from World Bank (2009).  
